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NOTES
similar recourse to the employee intentionally harmed by his employer. If the
employer were self insured, the compensation paid, plus costs, could be
applied in mitigation of damages. Against an insured employer, the insurer
could be subrogated to part of the employee's cause of action.3 Those states
which have comparable third party clauses 24 could achieve this result by apply-
ing them, either by analogy, or directly on the ground that the employer-
employee relationship was severed by the action of the employer, who would
then be in the position of a third party.22 However, a statutory enactment
would probably be necessary in some instances. 26
If this recommended procedure were applied to the Bevis case the em-
ployee could obtain both the speedy relief afforded by the compensation
act and full monetary satisfaction for all damages, punitive as well as actual.
The employer could not limit or insure against liability for his intentional
torts, yet would not suffer a double loss. Such an outcome would be more
in harmony with the liberal purposes of the compensation acts.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE AND WAIVER OF FEDERAL VENUE
UNDER "NEIRBO"
Venue relates to the place of trial.' Parties to litigation enjoy it as a
personal privilege, hence they may waive that privilege and consent to a
different situs for trial.2 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., held
between compensation and a common law procedure. If he chooses to accept compensa-
tion, the employer alone may proceed against the third party with any excess recovery over
the compensation paid, plus costs, going to the employee. For a classification and discus-
sion of the third party clauses, see Behrendt, supra note 17, at 231; Note, 7 MONTANA L.
REV. 89 (1946).
23. The Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia acts expressly permit an employee
who has been injured by his employer's willful and wanton misconduct to accept compen-
sation and sue the employer for any excess damages. ORE. Comp'. LAws ANN. § 102-1753
(1940); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7680 (1932); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2527 (1943). In
Texas, dependents of an employee who has died due to the intentional misconduct or
gross negligence of his employer may sue at common law for exemplary damages. TEX.
STAT., REV. Civ., ART. 8306, § 3 (1948).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. See Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 471, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930).
26. It has been contended that in the third party cases the employer or insurer could
be subrogated against the third party by analogy to the indemnity principle that subroga-
tion takes place where one party has been subjected to liability for the fault of another.
See Behrendt, supra note 17, at 240; Hardman, supra note 21, at 183. If this were applied
to the employer's intentional tort cases, a double recovery by the employee could be pre-
vented without resorting to statutory provisions, even though he were allowed both
compensation and a common law action.
1. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U.S. 264 (1922); Lee v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry., 260 U.S. 653 (1922).
2. 28 U.S.C. 1406(b) (1948). Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177,
179 (1928) ; Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 363 (1925) ;
Grover Tank & Manf. Corp. v. New England Terminal Co., 125 F.2d 71 (1st Cir.
1942). "The privilege accorded may be lost by failure to assert it seasonably, by formal
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that by 'appointment of an agent to receive service of process in a foreign
state a corporation waives its federal venue privilege.3 The question has now
arisen whether something less than express appointment of an agent is
equivalent to waiver.
In Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co.4 a Connecticut resident sued an
Ohio corporation in a federal district court in Massachusetts to recover for
personal injury and property damage resulting from an automobile collision
in Massachusetts. Jurisdiction over the defendant was founded on Massa-
chusetts' non-resident motorist statute.5 Plaintiff argued that under the
statute the defendant had appointed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles as its
agent to receive process, thereby waiving venue under the Neirbo do.ctrine.
The district court dismissed for lack of venue. On appeal the First Circuit
affirmed, reaioning that this result was not foreclosed by Neirbo since in
that case express appointment of an agent had been made.
Historically it appears that the First Circuit was not justified in concluding
that the Neirbo doctrine is tied to express appointment of an agent to receive
process. Justice Frankfurter in that momentous decision relied heavily on two
old cases, Ex parte Schollenberger and Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Harris.7
In the former it was decided that since the corporation had complied with
the Pennsylvania statute requiring foreign corporations to appoint resident
agents to receive process as a condition to doing business within the state,
the corporation was "found" there for jurisdiction AND venue purposes.
Having qualified for jurisdiction, the corporation was subjected to venue.
For perhaps the first time venue was the equation of jurisdiction. Neirbo
likewise equates the two. The fact that the federal venue statute prior to 1887
provided for suit where the defendant could be founds and subsequent ones
did not would seem to make no difference-a corporation has no legal exist-
ence outside the state of its incorporation," and therefore can no more be
submission in a cause, or by submission through conduct. Such loss of the privilege may
be regarded negatively as a waiver or positively as a consent to be sued." Urso v. Scales,
90 F. Supp. 653, 654 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
3. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
The venue requirement in diversity cases is that the suit must be brought in the district
where all of the plaintiffs or defendants reside, or if the defendant is a corporation then
in any district where the defendant is doing business. 28 U.S.C. 1391 (1948).
4. 183 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950).
5. MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 90, §§ 3A, 3B (1923).
6. 96 U.S. 369 (1878).
7. 12 Wall. 65 (U.S. 1870).
8. 18 STAT. 470 (1875) : ". . . and no civil suit shall be brought before either of
said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district
than that whereof he is an inhabitant or in which he shall be found."
9. Early thought as to the legal existence of a corporation was metaphorical. The
classical doctrine was that a corporation "must .dwell in the place of its creation and
cannot migrate to another sovereignty." Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 688 (U.S.
1839). Ex parte Schollenberger displaced metaphor with common sense and provided a
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"found" in a foreign state than it can be said to have Voluntarily waived its
venue privilege in a state beyond the present venue statute. Both fictions
have been mere tools employed by the courts to facilitate suit against a foreign
corporation.10
Neirbo's reliance on Harris is doubly significant: Schollenberger looked
to Harris to determine what was valid jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
In Harris Congress had passed a statute allowing a Maryland corporation to
extend its railroad into the District. This statute did not require the appoint-
ment of a resident agent. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that merely
coming in and doing business under this statute was a consent to suit in the
District of Columbia. And since Schollenberger equated this jurisdiction to
venue, it impliedly referred to Harris in order to define that action which
would subject a foreign corporation to venue."- Thus the facts of Schollen-
berger were well within the principle formulated.
new way of looking at corporations; for Schollenberger recognized that consent may give
venue and that the defendant consented, not to be found, but to be sued. Neirbo v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939).
10. The problem has as its roots the view taken in Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819), as to the nature of a corporation-that it is a creature of law.
If it is a creature of law, it must be the creation of the law of some particular jurisdiction.
But under the doctrine of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U.S. 1839), a corpora-
tion was permitted to do business in states other than that of its incorporation. As a result
of this decision it became necessary to determine where a corporation might be sued.
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U.S. 1855), permitted suits in foreign state
courts if an agent had been appointed there to receive process. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v.
Harris, 12 Wall. 65 (U.S. 1870), extended Lafayette by holding that if the corporation did
business in a foreign territory under a permissive statute, it consented to'suit there. Ex
parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1878), imposed federal jurisdiction upon a corporation
if it had appointed an agent to receive service of process in conformity with a state statute.
With this decision corporations acknowledged defeat on jurisdictional grounds in their
attempt to limit suits in foreign courts. They now carried forward their attack in terms
of venue.
Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 260 U.S. 653 (1922), established that a plaintiff waives
venue by suing defendant in a state court of a jurisdiction in which neither reside (de-
fendant subsequently removing). Corporations met crushing defeat with the decision of
Neirbo, where it was held that when a corporation appointed an agent within a state, as
required by state statute, not only were requirements of federal jurisdiction met, but the
corporation had waived venue and consented to suit in the federal courts within that state.
In 1948, Congress concurred in this historical trend by enacting the policy of Neirbo
into the venue statute. The policies leading to the enactment of statutes granting juris-
diction over a foreign person, natural or corporate, indicate a need that this described
trend in relation to venue be extended beyond the narrow situation where a corporation
doing business in a foreign state is required to appoint an agent to receive process. See
note 15 infra.
11. The reply to the Harris argument has been that Neirbo did not adequately dispose
of In re Keasbey and Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221 (1891). There "the Court had to deal
with a question of venue, depending upon the 'residence' of a foreign corporation in the
Southern District of New York where the suit was brought. The corporation had been
doing business in the state, but had not filed any consent to be sued; although, when
the suit was brought, there was a statute in New York requiring foreign corporations
doing business in New York to file such consents. Although Ex parte Schollenberger
was already nearly twenty years old, the Court did not extend the doctrine there an-
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It is true that before the Martin case there was deviation from the
holding of Harris." A statute obligating a corporation to appoint an agent
when it comes in and does business will not support a "waiver" of venue
unless there is compliance with the statute,'3 or the statute specifically pro-
vides for jurisdiction should the agent not be appointed. 14 But the principle
drawn from Harris-that express.appointment of an agent, or actual consent,
is not indispensable to waiver-had not been rejected.
If a mere fictional agent, state supplied, could waive venue for a foreign
resident, the result would be in dccord with the previously presented rationale
of Neirbo.'5 The reasoning behind the resident agent cases supports this
proposition. Judge Learned HInd has realistically pointed out that a corpora-
tion does not actually "consent" to suit in a foreign state by appointment of
an agent to receive process; it merely conforms with a condition placed upon
its doing business there.'6 Thus, it follows that the corporation might refuse
nounced in support of the venue; but declared that the action would not lie." Moss v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 149 F.2d 701, 702 (2d Cir. 1945). The New York statute in
Moss did not grant jurisdiction unless an agent were appointed. Any surviving importance
of Keasby, therefore, relates to this situation.
12. Occasional dicta cling to the Harris holding. See Gibson v. United States Lines,
74 F. Supp. 776, 782 (D. Md. 1947). This case sets forth a rationale of Neirbo similar
to that formulated in this note.
13. Compare Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra note 12, and Donahue v. Henry
Co., 78 F. Supp. 91, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) with Knott v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.
1947).
14. In Knott v. Furman, supra note 13, a Virginia statute was involved which pro-
vided that "If any company shall do business in this state without having appointed the
Secretary of the Commonwealth its true and lawful attorney as required herein, it shall
by doing such business in the State of Virginia be deemed to have thereby appointed the
Secretary of the Commonwealth its true and lawful attorney." VA. CODE ANN. § 3846a
(1946).
Donahue v. Henry Co., supra note 13, involved a New York statute which required
foreign corporations to obtain a certificate of eligibility before transacting business
within the state; the statute prescribed penalties for failure to conform, but it did not
appoint a state officer to act as agent upon the corporation's failure to do so. N.Y. GEN.
CORP. LAW §§ 210, 215.
Thus it can be seen that the essential principle of Harris rather than that of In re
Keasbey has been controlling where the state statute provides jurisdiction regardless of
whether an agent is appointed to receive process.
The Indiana and Illinois statutes on this point are very similar to the Virginia statute.
See IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-313 (Burn Repl. 1946) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c.32, § 111 (1933).
A foreign corporation doing business in one of the states with Virginia type statutes
without appointing an agent "consents" to suit in the federal as well as the state courts.
Knott v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1947).
15. In the area of control over a foreign corporation and of control over non-resident
motorists, the conditions placed upon the latter are grounded in the public policy of the
regulating state. It is submitted that if the venue objection is sustained, valid jurisdiction
over non-resident motorists would become in effect a nullity so far as original suit in the
federal court is concerned and where both parties are non-residents. To prevent nullifi-
cation of jurisdiction was a moving factor in the recognition of a waiver of venue in the
corporate resident agent cases. See note 10 supra.
16. Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148, 151 (S.D. N.Y.
1915). "When it is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to have consented to the
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to make the appointment, but it could be sued as if it had done so, should the
state statute so provide.
Many courts, including the First Circuit, have taken the position that the
provisions of the non-resident motorist statutes allowing services of process
on a state officer instead of the real defendant (who is notified by registered
mail) 1 do not involve a true agency.' 8 The theories have been that these
provisions place conditions upon the non-resident in return for the privilege of
using the highways of the state, or that the basis of the state's power is the
operation of a dangerous instrumentality within the state.19 But it should not
matter that the agency is fictional if the consent therefrom need only be
fictional and in reality based upon policy decisions of a sovereign. Non-
residents use the highways of Massachusetts; the law of that state appoints
an agent for them for purposes of receipt of process. The "consent" of a
corporation doing interstate business in a foreign state, such as the defendant
in Neirbo, is only one step removed from the "consent" of the non-resident
motorist; and in those states whose statutes provide for service upon a state
officer when a corporation does business within the state, without appointing
an agent, the consent is exactly the same.2 0 The corporation is forced to
appoint an agent, or is taken to have done so, while the non-resident motorist
has the intermediate step of appointment performed for him. And both situa-
tions are alike in that "consent" is given in return for a privilege-to use the
highways or to do business in a state.
The purpose of the venue requirement is to prevent placing an undue
burden on the defendant.2 In order to determine whether this burden would
be imposed upon the present defendant and those similarly situated by a
decision contra to that of the First Circuit, it is important to inquire where -
suit may be instituted. The defendant may be brought to trial in the district
where he resides, or in the district where the plaintiff resides; and if the de-
appointment of an agent to accept service, the court does not mean that as a fact it has
consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the court, for
purposes of justice treats it as if it had. It is true that the consequences so imputed to it
lie within its own control, since it need not do business within the state, but that is not
equivalent to a consent; actually it might have refused to appoint, and yet its refusal
would make no difference. The court, in the interest of justice, imputes results to the
voluntary act of doing business within the foreign state, quite independently of any intent."
17. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1043 (Burns Supp. 1949) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 90,
§ 3C (1937).
18. Other courts have taken the view, however, that the non-resident motorist statutes
establish a true agency through operation of law, and have adhered to this position to the
extent of refusing recovery against the defendant's executor or administrator for the
reason that the death of the defendant had terminated the agency. Harris v. Owens, 142
Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.2d 522 (1943); Dowling v. Winters, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E. 751
(1935). See Note, 26 IND. L.J. 93 (1950).
19. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 84, 1948 Supplement.
20. See n. 32 infra.
21. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165. 168 (1939).
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fendant is a corporation, it may be sued where it is doing business. The
defendant may also be sued in the state court under the provisions of the
state non-resident motorist statute. However, if suit is brought in the state
court, the defendant may remove to the federal courts.22 Therefore, if the
defendant may be sued in the state courts, or in the federal court if he desires
to remove, the burden would be no greater if he were allowed to begin his
action in the federal court2" sitting in the particular state in question. 24
Actually, the Martin decision gives the non-resident defendant an un-
warranted advantage over his non-resident opponent. The former with his
power to remove, has a choice of forum while the plaintiff is restricted to the
state court. 2   Although theoretically this should make no difference in the
outcome of litigation, 6 at times the calendar of the federal court is less
crowded and very often federal procedure is superior.27 Fairness and the
manner in which federal jurisdiction is provided 21 indicate that the plaintiff,
who normally may choose where the suit is to be tried, should also have access
to the federal court for any reason he may desire if the defendant is allowed
a choice." This was one of the grounds for the adoption of the Neirbo doc-
22. 28 U.S.C. 1441 (1948). Under Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 2660 U.S. 653 (1922),
plaintiff waives venue because he sued defendant in the state court and removal is geared
to suit in "any" state court. Defendant could hardly be heard to deny that he waived
venue in the federal court when it was he who removed.
23. See Note, 19 CHI-KENT L. REV. 135 (1940).
24. A possible extension of the rule advocated herein could lead to the result that
where basic jurisdiction is present in a federal court, venue, where not provided for,
would be satisfied by "waiver." The present outermost reaches of such jurisdiction are
exemplified by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Such applica-
tion of the "waiver" rule is not to be feared but to be desired as an implementation to
recognized jurisdiction. Feared evils from trial inconvenience should present little opposi-
tion because of 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1948), and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
However, the direction which the law has taken as to jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations which do not appoint a resident agent, see Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Harris, 12
Wall. 65 (U.S. 1870), and compare Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 149 F.2d 701 (2d
Cir. 1945), with Knott v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1947), is some indication that
as to jurisdiction over non-residents there will have to be a statute granting jurisdiction
in order for jurisdiction to be equated to venue.
25. Inequality also exists as a consequence of the Martin decision. A local plaintiff,
when suing a non-resident, has access to the federal courts while a non-resident plaintiff,
suing the same defendant in the same state, is denied such. Yet, in both instances the
requirements of federal jurisdiction are present.
26. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 13 IND. L.J. 564 (1938) ; Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183
(1947).
27. See Note, 25 IND. L.J. 365 (1950).
28. See 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332, 1359, 1441 (1948). Since removal jurisdiction is geared
to original jurisdiction, plaintiff and defendant generally have an equal opportunity to
litigate in the federal courts.
29. Since the court seems reluctant to apply the Neirbo doctrine to this situation and
since the granting of jurisdiction to the federal courts is a legislative matter, perhaps
Congress should put the parties on an equal status by withdrawing the defendant's
removal privilege in this particular instance or by granting the plaintiff the right to
sue in the federal courts.
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trine ;30 and as the purpose of the doctrine is present here, courts should inter-
pret it to cover this situation.31 Already Neirbo has been applied to the present
fact situation by several district courts.
32
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AS AFFECTED BY INSANE
DELUSIONS
The right to dispose of property by will is neither absolute nor immune
from challenge. Appellate cases in large numbers bear witness to the eager-
ness and frequency with which grasping or aggrieved heirs question the
validity of a testamentary disposition. Together with fraud and undue
influence, one of the most frequently used grounds for contest is mental
30. See MooRE's COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 57 (1949).
31. The Neirbo doctrine has received unqualified acceptance from many writers. See
Notes, 53 HARV. L. REV. 660 (1940); 49 YALE L.J. 724 (1940); Comment, 15 TEMPLE
L.Q. 92 (1940).
32. In Steele v. Dennis, 62 F. Supp. 73 (D. Md. 1945), the court reasoned: "The
precise question is whether by his use of the Maryland highways, in accordance with the
Maryland statute, the defendant has consented to be sued in the State court by the form
of service prescribed by the Act. No point has been made here that personal service on a
defendant in this state is less effective as bearing on consent than if the less direct form
of service authorized by the act had been had. I think it logically follows from the
principle of the Neirbo and Schollenberger cases that the defendant's consent to be sued
in the federal court is implied from his voluntary use of the Maryland highways."
For cases allowing suit in the federal courts see Urso v. Scales, 90 F. Supp.
653 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ; Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1950) ; Blunda v.
Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mo. 1947) ; Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. S.C.
1943) ; Andrews v. Joseph Cohen & Sons, 45 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Tex. 1941) ; Malkin v.
Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (1941); Williams v. James, 34 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. La.
1940). Contra: Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tenn. 1950). In the Waters
case an unsuccessful argument of waiver was based on subjection to the Tennessee non-
resident motorist statute. The court reasoned that one has a right to pass freely from
state to state, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), that this right is curtailed by
non-resident motorist statutes, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), and that in the cur-
tailing of a right the citizen assumes a burden. There is in the non-resident motorist
statutes an element of compulsion. But a corporation does not have the rights of a
natural person, cannot move freely from one state to another to transact business. It gives
up no right when it takes on its burden. There is, therefore, no compulsion on the corpora-
tion. Waiver and compulsion being inharmonious, the court refused to extend the
Neirbo doctrine.
The vulnerability of the reasoning in the Waters case is apparent. It is assumed
that a corporation could be kept out of a state. As to corporations doing interstate
business that assumption is probably fallacious. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220
N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). See also Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945) (excluding the railroad totally would have been greater interference with inter-
state commerce than regulating the length of its trains-a regulation struck down). A
better assumption would be that corporations engaging in interstate commerce have a right
similar to that of individuals to go from state to state. And corporations doing inter-
state business have been held to have "waived" venue (see Neirbo). Thus, the distinction
between the abridgment of a right of an individual and the assumption of a burden by
a corporation in exchange for a privilege seems invalid.
